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NOTES
ADAPTATION OF PRIVATE CONTRACT PRINCIPLES
TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
Participation of the Federal Government in the market for goods
and services has substantially increased in recent times as a result of a se-
vere depression, extended periods of military preparedness, and the chang-
ing concept of the role of government in our economy. The result has
been a huge expansion in the amount of goods and services absorbed by
agencies of the government,1 with a consequent multiplication of problems
peculiar to public contracting. A current English view is that the sov-
ereign may not fetter its freedom of action by any agreement the per-
formance of which concerns the public welfare.2 While the doctrine of
sovereign immunity has been influential in defining the contractual pre-
rogatives of the United States, 3 the inherent right of the governing
authority to bind itself in contract has always been acknowledged. 4 The
1. In 1940, prior to the United States' entrance into hostilities, Government pur-
chases of goods and services amounted to 30 billion dollars, or 15 per cent of the
national product. By 1944, at the height of war activity, the total absorbed by the
Government had increased to 149 billion dollars, equalling 45 per cent of the country's
total output. Government purchases fell 100 billion from 1944 to 1946, reducing the
percentage of federally appropriated goods and services to 17 per cent. No major
changes in this ratio occurred between 1944 and 1950. However, a 15Y billion dollar
increase, largely attributable to the expanding defense program, appeared between mid-
1950 and the first half of 1951. The share of goods and services presently allocated to
the United States, approximately 25 per cent, is expected to increase in proportion to
the severity of the current emergency. THE MIDYER EcoNomic REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT, TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS, July, 1951.
2. Mitchell, Limitations on the Contractual Liability of Public Authorities, 13 MOn.
L. REv. 318, 455 (1950). "The authorities seem to show that the doctrine is based
upon a public policy which has ceased to be applicable and which . . . extends beyond
the bounds where that policy could be operative. On the other hand, the authorities
suggest that the rule is derived from a more general principle. . . . This is the prin-
ciple that the state or ...any public authority, cannot be prevented from performing
functions essential to its existence and for which it was created." Id. at 466.
However, his conclusion is that the doctrind is not adequately supported by the authori-
ties and that certainly a right of action should exist against the state for breach of
contract.
3. The doctrine of sovereign immunity originally precluded Government contractors
from all legal redress. Petition to Congress concerning claims denied by disbursing
authorities was the private contractor's sole recourse. Carusi, Government Contracts
Before the Court of Claims, 41 A.!. 'L. REv. 161 (1909). In Kawanakoa v. Polyblank,
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), Justice Holmes explained, "A sovereign is exempt from suit
not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends. . . . As the ground is thus logical and practical, the
doctrine is not confined to powers that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical
theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual administration, originate and
change at their will the law of contract and property...."
4. In United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 115, 128 (U.S. 1831), Justice Story declared:
.a question has been made . . . whether the United States have, in their political
capacity, a right to enter into a contract or to take a bond in cases not previously
provided for by law. Upon full consideration of the subject, we are of the opinion that
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creation of the Court of Claims in 18555 and the Tucker Act in 18876
provided a means for aggrieved contractors to litigate their disputes with
the Government before a judicial tribunal. However, Congress is under
no obligation to create such a remedy, and the right to its withdrawal
at any time is recognized. 7 It is commonly thought that these statutes
were intended to place the United States on an equal basis with those
with whom it deals, although the legislative history fails to reveal this
as the motivating purpose.8 Nevertheless, the courts have continually
reiterated the proposition that the United States, upon entering the market
place, subjects itself to the same rules which govern private contracting,
unless such rules have been specifically abrogated by statute.9
It early became apparent that private contract principles were, in
some respects, inadequate to the solution of problems arising out of the
the United States have such a capacity. It is in our opinion an incident to the general
right of sovereignty. . . ." See also United States v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 343 (U.S. 1836) ;
United States v. Linn, 15 Pet. 290 (U.S. 1841); Neilson v. Lagoue, 12 How. 98 (U.S.
1851) ; Naylor, Liability of the United States in Contract, 14 TULANE L. REa. 580, 584
(1940).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 241 (1946).
6. Ibid.
7. In Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), cancellation of war-risk insur-
ance policies by legislative action was held invalid as a taking of property under the
Fifth Amendment. However, the Court recognized the difference between the con-
tractual rights under the policies and the remedy to enforce them. If Congress had
manifested an intention to eliminate only the remedy, presumably the court would have
upheld the legislation. At page 582 the Court said: "Mere withdrawal of consent to
sue on policies for yearly renewable term insurance would not imply repudiation. When
the United States creates rights in individuals against itself, it is under no obligation
to provide a remedy through the courts."
8. Rather, the objective appears to have been a desire to relieve Congress of the
burden occasioned by special legislation to adjust disputed contract claims. ". . . [T]hese
claims should be asserted before a judicial and not a legislative tribunal. It is not fit
that Congress should 'be a court to try causes, and the time it occupies in doing so is
taken from its legitimate work of legislating for the great interests of the growing
people." H.R. REP. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
9. United States v. Smoot, 15 Wall. 36, 45 (U.S. 1875) is the classic example.
Justice Miller asserted, ". . . for that branch of the Government [Congress] has limited
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to cases arising out of contracts express or
implied-contracts to which the United States is a party in the same sense in which
an individual might bd, and to which the ordinary principles of contracts must and
should apply." Smoot had contracted with the Government to supply a certain number
of horses to the cavalry. A subsequent official order required that the animals be
inspected upon delivery. Smoot attempted to take advantage of the order by claiming
that performance of his contract had become impossible. Applying the principle
enunciated above, the court rejected this contention. Other cases which assert this
principle include: Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947) ; Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Reading Steel Casting Co. v. United States, 268 U.S.
186 (1925) ; United States v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 253 U.S. 1 (1920) ; United States
v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918) ; Christier v. United States, 232 U.S. 234 (1915) ; Peck
v. United States, 102 U.S. 64 (1880); United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 700 (1878);
The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666 (U.S. 1869) ; Hunter v. United States, 5 Pet. 173
(U.S. 1831).
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NOTES
Government's business transactions. Several factors differentiate the
state from private business in its commercial undertakings. Necessarily
Government must operate solely through representatives, 10 who, unlike
agents in private enterprise, lack supervising authority motivated by
profit incenive to insure prudence and honesty. Division of govern-
mental functions results in one instrumentality providing funds, another
determining the manner of expenditure, and frequently, a third per-
forming the actual purchasing. Hence, all transactions must be founded
upon existing appropriations and statutory authorization,," and precau-
tionary measures are required to assure compliance with these limitations.
Further, the exigencies of war or other emergency often necessitate
placing the Government in a favored position to'facilitate mobilization.' 2
In numerous instances these differentiating factors have resulted
in the Government being accorded certain contractual advantages normally
unavailable to the private contractor. For example, when approval by
a higher authority is required by statute, it has been held that the contract
may become binding upon the contractor alone before the confirmation is
granted. 13 Similarly, when a signed writing is required' 4 it may be that
only the Government may enforce the agreement from the time negotia-
10. This is a frequently recognized differentiation between the contractual status
of the Government and that of a private contractor. To this effect see Coffman, War-
time Contracts and Control in Equity of Inordinate Profits, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693,
697 (1941) ; Thurlow, Some Aspects of the Law of Government Contracts, 21 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 300, 301 (1943).
11. REv. STAT. § 3732 (1875), 41 U.S.C. § 11 (1946) provides: "No contract or
purchase on behalf of the United States shall be made, unless the same is authorized
by law and under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment."
12. In Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 782, 783 (1948), the constitutionality
of the Renegotiation Act of 1942, which conferred extensive powers to the War Con-
tracts Price Adjustment Board to revise the terms of Government contracts, was upheld
under Congress' war powers.
Support for this view may be found in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion in Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 419 (1947), he asserts:
"Accordingly, if this contract were an ordinary commercial contract subject to the ordi-
nary rules of the law of contract, I should have to find against the Government .... But
this is not an ordinary peace-time Government contract. The Government may cer-
tainly assure the performance of contract upon which the effective conduct of the war
depended by tightening the consequences of non-performance of each stage in the
ultimate process of delivery of essential goods ......
13. District of Columbia v. Singleton, 81 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1951).
Approval of various types of transactions entered into by the Army's contracting
officers is required by the Army Procurement Procedure. A.P.P. § 1-604. Also see
D.C. CODE § 1-245 (Supp. VII 1949) ; note 29 infra.
14. REv. STAT. § 3744 (1875), repealed by 45 STAT. 985 (1941). A similar statute
in effect until recently was 45 STAT. 985 (1928), 5 U.S.C. § 219 (1946), repealed by PUB.
L. No. 247, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (October 31, 1951). The only requirements for formal
writings at the present are those prescribed by regulations. E.g., the Army Procure-'
ment Procedure provides, "All purchases made by a contracting officer will be evidenced
by written contracts ....." A.P.P. § 1-601.
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tions are concluded until such writing is effected. 15 Failure to comply
with prescribed formalities in advertising for bids's also may render the
contract enforceable only by the United States. 17 The usual doctrines of
ostensible authority are not applicable and the contractor is bound to
ascertain, at his peril, the authority of the officer with whom he is con-
tracting.' 8 The Statute of Limitations does not run against the United
States' 9 and interferences by government agents with a contractor's per-
formance of government contracts does not subject the state to con-
tractual liability.20 Legislation authorizes renegotiation of certain gov-
15. United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88 (1915).
16. REv. STAT. §3709 (1875), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1946), providing:
"Unless otherwise provided in the appropriation concerned or other law, purchases and
contracts for supplies and services for the Government may be made or entered into only
after advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals. .. "
In recent years, the Government has recognized the economic plight of small
businessmen who are unable to obtain Government contracts because they lack access
to the requisite information. An extensive program has been initiated to acquaint
the small business enterprises with current government contract opportunities. For a
thorough discussion of this recent trend see Shestack and Long, The Small Businessman,
and Government Contracts. 11 LA. L. Rxv. 426 (1951).
17. United States v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77 (U.S. 1869) ; Schneider v. United States, 19
Ct. Cl. 547 (1884); Driscoll v. United States, 13 Ct. Cl. 75 (1877); Thurlow, scpra
note 10, at 303.
18. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). A regula-
tion promulgated by the F.C.I.C. and published in the Federal Register prohibited
contracts of insurance covering certain planted wheat. Unaware of this provision, an
agent had entered into a contract insuring an excluded crop. When the agency refused
to cover a loss under the policy, Merrill sued for breach of contract. The Supreme
Court determined that the regulation constituted a limitation on the authority of the
officer, declaring: "Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone
entering into an agreement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately
ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds
of his authority. . . . And this is so even though, as here, the agent may have been
unaware of the limitation upon his authority." For a criticism of the case see Note,
Governmental Inmmunities, A Study in Millsplaced Solicitude, 16 U. oF CHI. L. RFV.
128, 137 (1948), in which the writer criticizes the decision for denying private parties
redress for losses occasioned by "mistake, delay or illegal actions" of government
agents. He suggests that the prudence and honesty of such agents would be enhanced
if they were required to answer to Congress for their increased expenditures due to
satisfaction of such claims. See also, Note, Legal Responsibility of Federal Agencies,
24 IND. L.J. 427 (1949).
19. United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R., 118 U.S. 120 (1885). The United
States failed to cash in coupons of bonds issued by defendant railway until after a
Tennessee statute of limitations had expired. To defendant's contention that the
statute extinguished its liability, Mr. Justice Gray replied: ". . the United States
asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government is not bound by any Statute of
Limitations unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so
bound." Id. at 124.
20. In Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925) the Court defined
this doctrine as follows: "the United States when sued as a contractor cannot be held
liable for an obstruction to the performance of the particular contract resulting from
its public and general acts as a sovereign." See also, Jones v. United States, 1 Ct.
Cl. 383 (1865). This limitation applies as well to acts of a legislative character.
Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190 (1864). See Naylor, supra note 4, at 585.
NOTES
ernment defense contracts to eliminate excess profits.2'1
Several rationalizations have been advanced in support of the appli-
cation of special rules to government contracts. It has been contended
that a person dealing with the state enters into a fiduciary relationship
which requires the utmost good faith and limits his compensation to an
amount commensurate with the benefit conferred.22 A similar conclusion
is reached under the theory that the Fifth Amendment, which requires
the Government to pay just compensation in the taking of property, con-
versely requires that no one doing business with the United States shall
receive more than just compensation. Contrary to the rule applicable
between private parties, under both of these theories the adequacy of the
consideration would become a relevant subject of inquiry in every case.23
Still another rationale involves the use of the Government's visitorial
powers over corporations to justify the application of different principles
where the contracting party is a corporate enterprise.2 4 It has also been
suggested that since the Government is essentially a non-profit organiza-,
tion, and its policies are formulated for the benefit of the entire body
politic, it should be permitted to exact any conditions which the contract-
21. The most recent renegotiation statute is PuB. L. No. 9, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(March 23, 1951) as amended by Pun. L. No. 183, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 20, 1951).
See note 12, supra. The theory underlying renegotiation seems incompatible with the
element of mutual risk-taking traditionally regarded as a characteristic of contractual
relationships. See Fain and Watt, War Procurement, A New Pattern in Contracts,
44 Co. L. R v. 127, 154, 155 (1944).,
Until recently, assignment of government" contracts was prohibited by REv. STAT.
§3477, 3737 (1875), 31 U.S.C. §203, 41 U.S.C. §15 (1946). This legislative policy
was reversed by the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 1029 (1940), 31 U.S.C.
§ 203, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1946) and contracts with the United States were made assignable
as security for loans. Note, Financing by Assignment of Government Contracts, 60
YALE. L.J. 548 (1951).
22. Coffman, supra note 10, at 701. The basis of the relationship would not -be
a technical trust, but a "confident reliance on the integrity, veracity and justice of
another," and the trust would be in the "skill and integrity" of the contractor. See
also, Grismore, Contracts with the United States, 22 MIcn. L. Rxv. 749, 750 (1924).
Discussion of the trust theory was engendered by United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 113 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1940), in which the court allowed Bethlehem to recover
profits on exorbitant World War I contracts. Subsequently, the case was affirmed
by the Supreme Court. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
Renegotiation was thereafter adopted to prohibit such excessive profits on existing
and future contracts. See Reardon, Problems Arising Under the Renegotiation Act,
33 Go. L.J. 153 (1945).
23. Grismore, supra note 22, at 757-58. This theory is criticized because it would
entail overhauling of all agreements made by the Government. Moreover, since the
statute of -limitations is inapplicable to the United States, such a re-examination into
the consideration could be done at any time in the future and would impair the security
of transactions.
24. Coffman, supra note 10, at 699, 700. Equity courts have jurisdiction through
the Government's reserved visatorial powers to protect the public from corporate
activities injurious to their interests. Such powers logically could be invoked to
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ing authority deems expedient.2 5  Such . a view would disregard the
absence of statutory authorization and principles of contract law which
would ordinarily nullify the condition or render the cont-ract void. Op-
posed to all of these views is the position that no variances from ordinary
contract doctrines should be countenanced unless Congress has specifically
so provided.2 6
It is likely .that additional instances may arise in which established
coniract doctrines initially appear inadequate to satisfactorily accommo-
date the interests of the sovereign with those of the contractors with
whom it deals. Perhaps just such a situation is presaged by the occasional
attempts of government agents to bind a party with whom they are
negotiating while themselves 'remaining entirely unfettered until a later
time. In the future it often may be expedient, or even essential, for the
Government to avail itself of such an arrangement in order to secure
the advantage of propitious market conditions or acquire scarce materials
and yet retain the right to repudiate at a later time if further operation
under the agreement would prove highly detrimental to the public inter-
est.2 7 The lengths to which some writers have gone in their attempts to
justify deviation from existing contract principles in Government trans-
actions might seem to suggest that a complete departure from the rules
of contract is indicated in all instances of Government acquisition and
I
recover inordinate profits made by corporations contracting with the Government,
because such unreasonable exactions are detrimental to the public welfare.
25. See Note, Penalties in Government Contracts, 43 ILL. L. REv. 238, 242, 243
(1948), in which the writer concludes that "this view recognizes that some of the
traditional, judicial safeguards for free contracting must be sacrificed to the efficacy
of big government. It is also a reflection of faith in the fairness of administrative
action."
26. Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 413, 414 (1947). The dispute
concerned the validity of a penalty provision inserted in a Government contract to
supply dried eggs for shipment under the Lend-Lease Program. The provision was
repugnant to the rules of private contract law which deny enforceability to liquidated
damages clauses having no relation to the actual harm incurred. The Government
contended that authority to 'impose such a penalty could be inferred from the broad
power to purchase granted by the Lend-Lease Act. The Court replied: "The power
to purchase on appropriate terms and conditions is, of course, inferred from every
power to purchase. But if that is the source of Congressional authority to impose
penalties, then any procurement officer, in war or in peace, could impose them. That
is contrary to the premise underlying all our decisions on this question which involve
government contracts. . . . The other view is such a radical break with the past
and so counter to the whole development of the law as to indicate that the Congressional
purpose should be plain before we take the step."
27. Such a need apparently was felt by the Judge Advocate General when he
issued the ruling: ". . . bidders may, by appropriate provision in the form'of bid, be
legally bound to keep their bids open for a reasonable time after the date specified
for receipts of bids." 2 BULL. J.A.G. 437 (1943). There is also a tendency among
private contractors to provide for contingencies by requiring bidders to make irrevocable
or "firm" offers. This practice is discussed in Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzle: A Study
of Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. oF Ciri. L. REv. 237 (1952).
NOTES
sale of goods and services. However, such a step should not be taken
lightly in view of the drastic readjustments in commercial practice it
would require and the suspicion with which it would likely be viewed by
the contractors who'deal with the United States. A re-examination of
concepts either already established or on the verge of recognition in the
law of contracts reveals means of adapting existing law to the changing
needs of the nation's largest businessman.
Analysis of a single instance in which there have been indications
that private contract theory is inadequate to the needs of a government
participating in commercial transactions on an ever-increasing scale may
suggest a valuable approach to the accommodation of other discordant
governmental and private interests which may emerge in future business
transactions to which the United Sthtes is a party. In D. C. v. Single-
ton,21 the Municipal Court of Appeals for the- District of Columbia
apparently perceived a need for a departure from the accepted require-
ment of mutuality of consideration. Singleton had submitted a bid to
provide supplies for the schools of the District, which was accepted by
a contracting officer. Subsequently, Singleton discovered his inability to
comply with the terms of his bid because another dealer held an exclusive
franchise for the area. A statute provided that all contracts made on
behalf of the District of Columbia by its contracting agents, where the
amount exceeded $3,000, must be approved by the Commissioners before
constituting a contract binding on the District.29  Singleton sought to
take advantage of this approval requirement by asserting that there was
no contract, binding upon himself or the District, until approval, and he
therefore was free to withdraw his bid. 3° The Government argued that.
28. 81 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1951).
29. D.C. Code § 1-245 (Supp. VII 1949), providing: "... but no contract of
$3,000 or more entered into on behalf of the District of Columbia by any contracting
officer appointed pursuant to sections 1-244 to 1-249 shall be binding upon said District
of Columbia, or give rise to any claim or demand against said District of Columbia,
until approval by the Commissioners or a majority of them sitting as a Board."
30. Singleton contended that the statute was a limited grant of authority to con-
tracting officers and did not authorize them to enter into contracts in excess of $3,000,
execution of the latter being reserved to the Commissioners by the approval require-
ment. The title of the Act, "An Act to Authorize the Commissioners of the District of
Columbia to Appoint Officers to Make Contracts in Amounts Not Exceeding $3,000,"
was invoked in support of this position. His further theory was that the language of
the statute, which indicates that no claim or demand shall arise against the District prior
to approval, did not by its silence on the point mean that one did arise against the
individual contractor. The intent of Congress could not have been to give the District
an "escape-hatch" by making contracts binding only upon the private party until action
by the Commissioners. Moreover, the acceptance of the contract was incomplete, being
conditioned upon some future act on the part of the District, and could create no
enforceable agreement. Brief for Appellants, pp. 7-19, Singleton, et. al. v. District of
Columbia, in the United .States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Appeal
of District of Columbia v. Singleton, 81 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1951).
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the acceptance created a valid contract, which, however, was binding
only upon Singleton until the requisite approval was effected. 31 In an
attenuated opinion, the court found for the Government, cryptically ob-
serving that the statute was, "clearly enacted for the benefit of the District
and not parties contracting with the District. ' 32 The court thus refused
to accede to the contention that the contract was illusory.33
The court was confronted with competing lines of authority. Plain-
tiff relied on United States v. N. Y. and Porto Rico S. S. Co.,34 a case in
which the Government sought recovery for breach of contract where the
agreement had not been reduced to writing and signed by both parties
as required by the statute.35 While the Supreme Court acknowledged
that there could have been no recovery against the Government without
compliance with the statutory diredive, it perceived no objection to the
action initiated by the official agency. Since the writing requirement was
enacted to prevent fraud by government agents, it was designed for the
benefit of the United States and not for the private contractor, who had
no need of protection. 6
31. The District argued that the statute was clear in giving contracting officers the
power to enter into contracts in excess. of $3,000, while reserving only a power of
review. This was said to be inferred from the wording of the statute to the effect
that contracting officers, "may exercise any powers with respect to making and entering
into contracts. . . ." The provision in the statute that no claim or demand shall arise
against the District was alleged to signify that only the contractor's right to enforce,
and not the creation of a valid contract, was postponed. It was further asserted that
there were no principles of mutuality applicable to a situation of this sort, and the
statute could not be invoked by a contracting individual to escape his obligation. Brief
for Appellant, pp. 6-27, District of Columbia v. Singleton, 81 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1951).
32. 81, A.2d 335, 337 (D.C. 1951).
33. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 146 (1950). "It has been said, thousands of times,
that both parties to a contract must be bound or neither is bound .... The statement
comes nearer the truth in bilateral contracts, promise exchanged for promise. Usually,
both promises become binding at the moment of acceptance of the offer. If, at that
moment, something prevents one of the promises from being legally enforceable, it is
frequently assumed that the return promise is void for lack of sufficient consideration."
34. 239 U.S. 88 (1915).
35. REv. STAT. § 3744 (1875), 41 U.S.C. § 16 (1946), repealed by 45 STAT. 985
(1941), 41 U.S.C. § 16 (1946). "It shall be the duty of the Secretary of War, Navy,
and Interior to cause ... every contract made by them . .. to be reduced to writing
and signed by the contracting parties with their hames at the end thereof . . . within
thirty days. . . ." Also included were certain provisions making it a misdemeanor
for contracting officers to fail promptly to comply with the statute.
36. The Court conceived an analogy between this writing requirement and the
Statute of Frauds. The two are distinguishable, however, since either party to a
contract may avail himself of the latter, depending on which has signed the agreement.
By contrast, under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the writing provision, no
matter which party has failed to sign the contract it can be enforced only by the
Government.
The writing requirement has been productive of much litigation. Although no
indication of this appears in Singleton, the writing cases actually are in conflict as to
when the contract is formed. In Sanger & Moody v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 47, 66
(1905), claimant sought reformation for mistake in the writing and contended that the ne-
NOTES
Completely ignored in the Singleton case, however, were decisions
involving approval by a higher authority. In Monroe v. United States,
37
gotiations constituted the actual contract. Acknowledging that the preliminary
negotiations, bid, and acceptance are the essential components of a binding agreement
between individuals, the court nevertheless indicated that in a government contract
neither party is bound until the writing is signed. In Gillioz v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl.
454, 466 (1944), the Court of Claims again observed that a government contract does
not come into being until both parties have affixed their signatures to a writing in
conformity with the statute. Other cases to this effect include: Gillespie v. United States,
47 Ct. Cl. 310, 312 (1912) ; McLaughlin v. United States, 37 Ct. Cl. 150, 185 (1902) ;
Lender v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 530, 533 (1872) ; Henderson v. United States, 4 Ct.
Cl. 75, 83 (1868).
On the other hand, in Ackerlind v. United States, 240 U.S. 531, 534 (1916), -the
Supreme Court approved the Porto Rico decision. The court reformed the contract
at the instance of the private party. Since the mistake occurred only in the formal
contract the plaintiff could refer' to the prior unsigned agreement in support of hi
contention. The initial unsigned contract was not void but merely unenforceable
against the Government. American Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States, 259 U.S.
75, 78 (1922), held that the contemplation of a formal agreement did not prevent the
negotiations from creating a binding contract where the claimant was attempting to
repudiate the oral contract and recover a statutory price for supplies furnished to the
Government. And in Waters v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 126 (1932), on facts nearly
identical to the Porto Rico case, the Government recovered by a counterclaim based
upon an unwritten agreement which violated the statute.
Some cases involving private parties seeking to hold the Government have avoided
declaring a contract void for non-compliance with the statute. Erie Coal & Coke Co.
v. United States, 266 U.S. 518, 521 (1925), held the United States was not bound
because the necessary formalities had not been performed; and Camp v. United States,
113 U.S. 648, 652 (1885), merely indicated that no contract could bind the Government
unless in writing as required by a regulation. In Lindsley v. United States, 4 Ct. C1.
359, 365 (1868), the court explicitly pointed out that the statute does not prohibit
verbal contracts but merely makes them unenforceable against the Government. See
also, Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1876). Other cases recognizing the existence
of a contract before the writing is concluded are those which held that after per-
formance no barrier to recovery on the contract is presented by the initial unen-
forceability. Clark v. United States, supra; St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. United States,
191 U.S. 159 (1903); Emery v. United States, 13 F.2d 658 (D. Conn. 1926); Moran
Bros. v. United States, 39 Ct. Cf. 486 (1904).
Similarly, the statute requiring advertising for bids on government contracts, supra
note 16, has evoked competing lines of authority. Where this requirement has not been
met, contractors have been barred from recovery against the Government on the ground
that the contract is void. United States v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77 (U.S. 1869) ; Schneider v.
United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 547 (1884). However, as with the writing cases, it also has
been held that the statute is for the protection of the United States and is unavailable
as a defense to a suit by the Government. American Smelting and Refining Co. v.
United States, supra. In a similar situation where advertising was a prerequisite to the
sale of naval vessels, the Attorney General held that failure to comply did not render the
contract void, but only voidable at the option of the Government. 38 Ops Ar'Y GEN.
328 (1935); Note, 4 GEo. WAsH. L. Rrv. 520 (1936).
That the writing and advertising cases should not control the Singleton result is
suggested by one crucial distinction. A private contractor may ascertain, prior to the
bidding, whether the advertising requirement has been met, or he may insist upon
prompt execution of a formal written agreement But there is no means by which he
can determine whether final approval will be accorded. Thus, under the Singleton
decision, he cannot avoid binding himself prior to the time when the Government becomes
bound.
'37. 184 U.S. 524 (1902).
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the contract by its terms was subject to approval by the Chief of Engi-
neers. The contractor attempted to hold the United States prior to final
approval. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the action, observed that
the requirement constituted a condition precedent to the formation of
a valid contract. The implication was that the Government could not
have held the contractor. The rationale of this and other approval
cases would seem to foreclose the issue in the Singleton case.
3 8
The Singleton opinion is subject to serious criticism not only be-
cause it fails to reveal the basic reason for its result, but also because it
prefers, as a governing precedent, a case far less apposite than the ap-
proval cases relied on by the defendant. Nevertheless, the result which
the court was determined to reach may have been a legitimate one. How-
ever, before resorting to judicial fiat as a substitute for rational analysis
of the basic considerations presented in a controversy where special con-
tractual concessions are sought by the Government, future courts might
profitably explore the existing body of contract doctrine.
Consideration of the law of voidable contract suggests a possible
means of reconciling the special concessions accorded Government with
the existing framework of contract law. There, the fundamental policy
is to protect the infants or defrauded persons from improvident engage-
ments, perhaps attributable to a recognized disability.3 9 In dealing with
voidable contracts, courts have experienced little difficulty in accounting
for the absence of reciprocity necessary to satisfy traditional notions of
consideration. The absence of mutuality stems, not from the bargain
itself, but from some element outside its terms.40 The present exchange
38. See Little Falls Knitting Mill Co. v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 1 (1908), in
which the court stipulated: "A contract containing a clause which makes its final
execution dependent upon the approval of the head of a department or some super-
vising official of the Government is not a binding obligation until such approval is had."
Id. at 17; Cathell v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 368, 371 (1911), where the dispute hinged
upon the time when a binding contract was formed. The court decided: ". . . a contract
providing for the approval of a superior officer is not a valid subsisting agreement
until such approval is made. . . . Neither the contractor nor the defendants [United
States] incurred liabilities until it was approved."
39. See Willis, Rationale of the Law of Contract, 11 IND. L.J. 227, 249 (1936).
"The last class of promises to which social control is applied is those promises which
are voidable. . . . In such cases the law will . . . make the promises contracts. In
addition, it will apply . . . social control, to allow the infant ... to avoid the contract
. . [T]he social interests ... are important enough so that the law protects them by
giving the injured party a power of avoidance. .. "
40. "In the second [voidable contracts] we have all the affirmative elements of a
valid contract, but the obligation of one of the parties is affected or taken away owing
to the presence of some defense or negative element which does not affect the obligation
of the other. These cases of voidable contracts can therefore be satisfactorily explained
only by the theory here advanced, viz., that there is ample consideration at present in the
reciprocity or mutuality of the respective undertakings, although one of the parties
may have an absolute personal defense. A promise by a minor, therefore, furnishes
NOTES
of promises constitutes sufficient consideration on both sides. It would
seem arguable that in some respects the Government is incapacitated in
its business dealings by handicaps equally as severe as those prompting
judicial recognition of voidability in the cage of minors and insane.41
However, the voidable contracts concept has been narrowly applied and
courts and legislatures are more ready to limit than expand it.42 The
merit of enlarging this doctrine would lie in the ability of the courts to
allow or reject the Government's claim, depending upon whether a dis-
ability were shown to justify the need under the particular circum-
stances.
Another approach would necessitate implication of a promise on
the part of the Government to use good faith and reasonableness in con-
sidering the contract. Such an obligation might be deemed sufficient
consideration for requiring a contractor to be bound. Courts are fre-
quently willing to imply promises, to uphold the.validity of contracts, as
where a promise to sell necessarily involves an implied agreement by the
other party to buy.43 In Sylvan Crest Sand and Gravel Co. v. United
States,'4 4 the court approved such a theory in upholding an agreement
against the objection that it was illusory. The Government had reserved
a sweeping right of cancellation which would have rendered the considera-
tion insufficient had the court not found an implied promise by the United
States to give reasonable notice before exercising the right.
That such a requirement of good faith and reasonableness would
constitute adequate consideration is suggested by the fact that the courts
consideration . . . because there is reciprocity in the terms of the bargain." Ballantine,
Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HARv. L. REv. 121, 131, 132 (1914); SELECTED READINGS
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTs, 343, 351 (1931).
41. See notes 10-16 supra. and accompanying text.
42. See Note, Avoidance by Infants of Contracts for Per~formance of Services, 21
RocxYv MT. L. REv. 213 (1949), discussing the recent case of Warner Bros. Pictures
v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 192 P.2d 949 (1948), which upheld the constitutionality of a
California statute limiting the power of infants to avoid their contracts. ". . . [Ilt is ...
another step in the modern trend toward limiting the privilege of infants to avoid their
contracts. .. ." Id. at 213.
43. "... [T]he tendency has developed, whenever possible, as a matter of inter-
pretation of intention, to imply a promise where one is lacking in order that there
may be mutuality." Whitney, Implying a Promise to Establish Mutuality, 11 ST.
JOHNS L. REv. 51, 52 (1936). See also, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18 n.43, § 144 n.12
(1950).
44. 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945). Plaintiff had contracted to deliver trap rock of
a certain amount, "as required." The resevation of the power of cancellation was
unrestricted as to time. The Government contended the power was exercised by a mere
failure to order delivery. The court's implication of the promise to give notice seems
to have defeated an attempt by the Government to create a contract wholly devoid of
obligation upon its part. Perhaps this suggests that the courts are unwilling to validate
attempts by the Government to dispense with mutuality of obligation.
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have uniformly upheld "sales on approval" contracts.45 There the buyer
agrees to retain the purchase only if he is satisfied with it. Some cases
permit rejection if the buyer is honestly dissatisfied4 6 while others adopt
a standard of reasonableness. "T Conceivably this technique may be
adopted to bind the private contractor while allowing the Government
approval authority an opportunity to reject if reasonably dissatisfied.
The concept of firm offer, vigorously advocated in recent years as
a valuable adjunct to private commercial transactions, suggests another
contractual basis for enabling the Government to circumvent the consid-
eration dogma which denies validity to one-sided government contracts.
This notion converts the offeror's considerationless proposal, to remain
irrevocable for a period of time, into a dependable basis' of action while
the offeree is in no way obligated. While firm offer has never been rec-
ognized as a matter of common law, New York and Pennsylvania have
enacted legislation which provides for enforcement of such promises. 48
In addition, the proposed Uniform Commercial Code includes a provision
that short-term firm offers be given effect according to their terms. 49
These instances indicate a trend toward enforceability of deliberately
made promises despite the absence of consideration.
It has been asserted that firm offers should be enforced without
specific statutory authorization when seriously proposed 5 0 The de-
liberative and evidentiary functions of consideration would be performed
45. "That a binding contract exists in the case of a 'sale on approval,' before the
buyer has expressed his approval or disapproval, seems seldom to have been doubted in
Anglo-American law." Patterson, 'Illusory' Promises and Promisors' Optims, 6 IOWA
L. BULL. 129, at 135 (1920), SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 401
at 406 (1931).
46. Hoffman v. Gallaher, 6 Daly 42 (N.Y. 1842).
47. Fechteler v. Whittemore, 205 Mass. 6, 91 N.E. 155 (1910).
48. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33(5) (1949). "When hereafter an offer to enter into
a contract is made in a writing signed by the offeror or his agent, which states the offer
is irrevocable during a time fixed, the offer shall not be revocable during such period
or until such time because of the absence of consideration .for the assurance of
irrevocability." And see Jarka Corp. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 182 F.2d 916, 919 (2d Cir.
1950) in which Judge Clark stated: ". . . its [the. contract's] clear intent was to keep
the offer open for a stated time .... If New York law is applicable to the transaction,
the offer is binding even though without consideration."
The Pennsylvania provision provides for the enforceability of a much wider group
of promises. "A written release or promise, hereafter made and signed by the person
releasing or promising, shall not be unenforceable for lack of consideration if the
writing also contains an additional express statement, in any form of language, that
the signer intends to be legally bound." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6 (Purdon, 1949).
49. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §2-205 (1950), provides: "An offer by a
merchant to buy or sell goods expressed in a signed writing to be" 'firm' or otherwise
irrevocable needs no consideration to be irrevocable for a reasonable time, or during a
stated time .. " See Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Should It Be Enacted, 59
YALE L.J. 821, 827, 829 (1950).
50. Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 CoL.. L. REV. 783, 788 (1941) ; Sharp, Pronses,
Mistake, and Reciprocity, 19 U. or CHi. L. REv. 286, 292 (1952).
'N'OTES
by requiring formalities in the making of the promise not to revoke.51
Less easily dispensed with are the elements of equality and exchange in
the concept of consideration. That one party cannot be bound unless
the other is also bound-an idea which the law of contract has clung to
with tenacity-is abandoned in the firm offer. 2  Moreover, the courts'
diminishing solicitude for the requirement of benefit to the promisor, in
return for his promise, is completely eliminated. 53 The latter obstacles
suggest that the firm offer should not be recognized as a valid principle of
the law of contracts under all circumstances but should be limited in its
application to those situations in which the need for such a device more
than offsets these objections.
The ability of one party to an agreement to bind the other without
himself assuming any concurrent duties would constitute a formidable
weapon in the hands of the contractor in the superior bargaining position.
Hence, such an innovation should be sanctioned, even at the instance of
the Government, only when the strongest justification can be demon-
strated. Perhaps the propriety of such a departure is a subject of inquiry
which exceeds the scope of the judicial prerogative. Surely the courts
should not seek to justify the deviation solely on the strength of a
statute such as that involved in the Singleton case, which is wholly devoid
of any explicit manifestation of Congressional intent to dispense with
mutuality of consideration.
It has never been conclusively demonstrated that the requirements
of Government in its business dealings transcend the importance of retain-
ing a single body of law governing contractual relations.54 Adherence to
such a unified theory, as opposed to recognition of Government's absolute
51. Ibid.
52. "We are dealing ... with the argument that it is unfair or somehow contrary
to principle, or inconsistent with the nature of things to treat an undertaking against
revocation as binding . . . in the absence of acceptance by the offeree."
"Equality is one of the . . . indispensable working notions of the law . . . it requires
careful use. It does not require that people be treated identically, if there is a prac-
tical reason of the sort with which courts are qualified to deal, for distinguishing them.
... There would be no violation of any simple working idea of equality if the bidder
who has made a promise were treated quite differently from the contractor who has
made none." Sharp, Promises, Mistake, and Reciprocity, supra note 50, at 289.
53. "There appears to be a feeling that undertakings for which no return is made
ought not to be enforced. In Roman and continental law the limitations . . . dependent
on . . . 'exchange' have been almost entirely superseded .... The doctrines of considera-
tion . . . may be developing in the same direction." Sharp, Promises, Mistake, and
Reciprocity, supra note 50, at 290, 291.
54. In some areas of the law of contracts, the ordinary rules hav been manifestly
inadequate to allow the courts to solve the peculiar problems confronting them. A
notable example is the field of insurance, where the courts have resorted to tort
principles to relieve individuals upon whom unconscionable conditions have been
imposed by the insurer. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, 43 CoL. L. Ray. 629 (1943).
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right to exact any conditions it sees fit, seems preferable. If the United
States were exempt from the rules of contract, considerations in support
of or opposition to a claimed concession would become irrelevant. Con-
versely, such considerations are determinative of controversies resolved
under existing contract law. Blanket endorsement of such an exemption
would invite extreme business practices with ramifications affecting a
sizeable percentage of commercial transactions. Such a license, mani-
festly impinging 'upon the security of government contractors, should be
vindicated only upon a showing of positive necessity.' Contractors'
familiarity with existing commercial practice and aversion to uncertain
change might necessitate a substitute for security in the form of 'increased
cost of goods and services to Government. It should not be prematurely
assumed that contract doctrine lacks the flexibility to adapt itself to the
changing position of Government in our economy.
The delicate reconciliation of interests required can best be accom-
plished by adherence to existing contract doctrine whenever possible, by
intelligent legislative or judicial adaptation of existing principles to new
situations where necessary, and above all, by a method of judicial decision
which clearly presents the competing factors in a controversy.
EFFECT OF ILLEGAL ABDUCTION INTO THE
JURISDICTION ON A SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION
As prerequisites to a valid criminal conviction the accused must be
present at all proceedings of the court' and must be tried in the state in
which the alleged crime was committed. 2 While these requirements cause
little difficulty when the accused is apprehended within the jurisdiction
in which the crime occurred, frequently the individual has fled the juris-
diction of the accusing state. In contemplation of this possibility, the
Constitution expressly permits rendition of prisoners from one state to
another.3 The procedures established to implement the Constitutional
provision4 are comparatively simple,3 and rendition ordinarily will be
granted,0 usually as a matter of course. Nevertheless, at times over-
zealous police officers remove the accused from another jurisdiction with-
1. ORFIELD, CRIIfNAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 413 et seq. (1947).
2. See Note, 15 L.R.A. 722 (1892).
3. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 2.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (Supp. 1951).
5. See Note, 135 A.L.R. 973 (1941).
6. Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 349 (1939)
